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APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
In this record there is at no place found an attack by 
respondents on the validity of the zoning ordinance. 
Neither does there appear any attack by appellants on 
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the legality of the existence of the Board of Adjustment, 
nor any attack upon its jurisdiction to act within the 
proper scope of its statutory functions. 
What divides us is chiefly the matter of the extent 
of the power of the Board of Adjustment, that is to say, 
it is appellants' contention that the Board of Adjust-
ment can not directly or indirectly exercise the broad 
powers of the City Commission with respect to zoning. 
In other words, it cannot change the boundaries of zon-
ing districts nor create a new zone of one class within 
another zone but must at all times act in general har-
mony with the zone uses as prescribed by the City Com-
missiOn. 
It must be remembered at all times that difference in 
zones essentially depends upon usc differences, and in 
this respect from the beginning of zoning laws business 
uses have been sharply distinguished from residence 
uses. 
Subordinately to this general line of demarcation 
there has been and properly so, sub-classification as be-
tween different businesses in business zones, and also 
sub-classification in residence zones with respect to size 
and character of residence property buildings, for ex-
ample, two or three family dwellings, apartment houses, 
churches, etc. Also minor considerations such as dis-
tances from lot lines, area, ways, etc., appear, which, as 
we contend, come properly within the jurisdiction of the 
Adjustment Board, always subject to a de novo review 
by the duly constituted courts. 
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With this notion there is no overlapping of jurisdic-
tion or function of the proper legislative body (the City 
Commission) and the Board of Adjustment, and there 
arises no question of unconstitutional delegation of 
power to the Board of Adju:otment, and the system is 
harmonious, sensible and suited to practical realities as 
well as to traditional notions of jurisprudence. 
Without analysis of the cases, as it seems to us, the 
respondents have cited numerous cases indiscriminately 
as supposed to be illustrative of various points, but an 
examination of such authorities shows that many of 
them have no application to the particular point to which 
they are cited, although the great number of them do 
bear on the fundamental contentions as we have outlined 
them. 
Some of the authorities cited are not as helpful as 
they would be had the courts not been limited in the 
scope of their review. Happily, here the court is not 
limited in any wise in that respect. 
·we shall examine respondents' cases in detail so far 
as they bear upon the questions here, and ·we submit that 
a reading of those cases will result in the conclusion that 
at least ninety percent of them are in harmony with 
our contention. 
On page ten of brief occurs the first case that IS 
apposite. 
L. & M. Investment Co. vs. Cutler (Ohio), 180 
N. E. 379. 
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From this case is quoted an excerpt to the effect 
that the Board of Appeals is the proper body to de-
termine the matter of unusual hardship, rc::mlting from 
a compliance with the strict letter of the zoning ordi-
nance. 
From this doctrine counsel have deduced the conclu-
sion that the order of the Board of Adjustment is to be 
regarded as having weight in the courts on the trial of 
the review proceedings which hy the statute is made 
plenary and de novo. 
That such a conclusion is logically drawn is of course 
inconceivable and contrary to universal juriclicial con-
ceptions. 
On the next page the point is made that there is a 
presumption in favor of the correctness of the determi-
nation of the board. This of course cannot be true where 
the trial is de novo. Moreover, the matter of the scope 
of the powers of the Board of Adjustment involves 
purely a question of law. 
Let us now look at the cases cited by respondents. 
In the Cutler case (just cited), the defendant sought 
a permit to remodel an existing structure for usc as a 
sanitarium (a use not prohibited by the ordinance) but 
the building did not have the proper amount of setback 
from the street that would have been required of a new 
building. The board granted the permit and its action 
was upheld, the court holding that the ''use" being 
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within the ordinance, the provision as to setback under 
the circumstances was a proper matter for the board of 
appeals, the building having been constructed prior to 
the passage of the zoning ordinance. 
In Home for Hebrew Infants vs. Walsh (Hand 
Realty Co.) 227 N. Y. S., 570, the court annulled the ac-
tion of the board of appeals in permitting a garage in a 
residence district. The court said: 
''The purchaser buying property in restricted 
residential districts cannot be heard to complain 
because of small profits arising from confining him 
to residential uses of this property. He is presumed 
to buy with his eyes open." 
The court quoted with approval from the court of 
appeals in 
People vs. Walsh, 148 N. E., 760: 
''The mere fact that a garage is more profitable 
than any other structure is not sufficient evidence 
of hardship." 
In Revorg Healty Co. vs. "Walsh, the court said: 
Unless ''impossible to use the property for any 
other purpose than a gasoline service station, re-
spondent has not shown practical difficulties or un-
necessary hardships sufficient to exempt it from the 
general rule.'' 
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In In re Dawson (Okla.), 277 Pac., 226, the court 
affirmed the district court's affirmance of the Board of 
Adjustment which denied a permit to conduct a funeral 
home in a restricted district. 
In that case, unlike in the case at bar, the property 
owner attacked the validity of the zoning ordinance. 
The court quoted with approval from the Fordham 
Manor case (N. Y.) 155 N. E., 575, to the effect that the 
power to change the map (the use map) is reserved to 
the board of estimate and apportionment (like here to 
the City Commission), and the power of the Board of 
Appeals is confined to "variations in special cases to 
meet some unusual emergency, some unnecessary hard-
ship.'' And the court emphasized the very limited power 
of the Board of Adjustment as a premise for holding 
that no legislative power had been delegated to such 
board. The intimation is strong, indeed, irresistible, 
that upon a holding that the Board of Adjustment had 
the power to change the use, the ordinance would have 
been held void as an improper delegation of power to 
such board. 
In Bellofatto vs. Board of Adjustment (N. J.), 141 
At. 781, the court dismissed a writ of certiorari, and so 
affirmed the Board of Adjustment in denying a permit 
for a service station in a residence district zoned as 
residential. The court as to presumption as to the right-
ness of the action of the Board merely assumed such pre-
sumption because of the entire absence of evidence on the 
point. 
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In Sundlun vs. Zoning Board (R. I.), 145A. 451, the 
Board of Review denied a permit for a gas station. But 
the holding was that the vicinity was in fact of a busi-
ness character and the court in effect held that if the 
zoning ordinance prohibited such use it would be un-
constitutional. The question of the power of the Board 
\Vas not involved as it is in the case at bar because there 
the Board was expressly by the statute given the power 
to permit the proposed use which fact the court specially 
noted. 
In Drabble vs. Zoning Board of Review (R. I.), 159 
At. 828, the court affirmed the action of the zoning board 
in refusing to permit an extension of a non-conforming 
use. 
In Norcross vs. Board (.Mass.), 150 N. E. 887, the 
court held that its power of review was very limited, 
and that it could not properly annul the action of the 
board in granting a variance as to the height of a build-
ing, but it took occasion to say that the Board's power 
was designed to be sparingly exercised. It said: 
''It is only in rare instances and under excep-
tional circumstances that relaxation of the general 
restrictions established by the statute ought to be 
permitted. The power granted is only for the relief 
of specific instances peculiar in their nature. It 
does not extend to modification or changes of essen-
tial partieulars or the scheme of the zoning act. It 
does not include immediate or prospective changes 
in boundary lines of districts.'' 
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It also said : 
"Financial considerations alone, however, can-
not govern the action of the board.'' 
Zahn vs. Board, 27 4 U. S. 32G; 71 L. 107 4, il-l not in 
point. 
Court held that its judgment is not to be substituted 
for the judgment of the legislative body. (Not the Board 
of Appeals.) 
In Altschul vs. Ludwig (N. Y.), 111 N. E. 216, the 
court held that plaintiff was entitled to an injunction 
prohibiting the approval of plans contrary to the build-
ing code, and that the board of appealH had no power 
to permit a prohibited use. 
The Nectow case, U. S. 72 L. 842, is not in point. It 
simply held that a particular zoning ordinance was void. 
In Allen vs. City of Patterson (N. J.), 121 At. 610, 
the board of appealH permitted a variance of a private 
garage in respect of the distance only from the highway 
under circumstances showing that unless such variance 
were granted the private garage could not be built at all. 
St. Albens-Springfield Corp. vs. Connell, 257 N. Y. 
73, docs not involve the question of the extent of the 
power of the board of appeals to vary. It holds that the 
zoning ordinanec itself in its application to the property 
owner was unconstitutional. 
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People vs. Leo, 173 N. Y. S. 217, is not at all in point. 
In the ca:,;e of People vs. Walsh (Fordham Manor YS. 
Walsh), 155 N. K 575, the extent of tlle power of the 
board to vary was not directly inYolYed or decided but 
the court aHsnmed that it bad some power to permit a 
public garage in a residence distriet. The court held, 
however, that there was no sho\ving of practical diffi-
culty or urmeces:,;ary hardship. rrhe court said: 
''Presumably t1Jis owner who acquired the par-
cels with notice of zoning resolution paid a consider-
ation appropriate to the limitation of the use. There 
is no elemeut of the unexpected or the incalculable 
to aggravate his plight,'' and, 
''The power to change the map is reserved by 
the charter to the board of estimate and appor-
tionmeut. rl'lle power of the board of appeals is 
confined to variation:,; iu special cases to meet some 
unusual emergency, some unnecessary hardship.'' 
In Levy vs. Board of Stawlards and Appeals (N.Y.), 
196 N. E. 284, the board had granted au applicatiou for 
a variauce to permit a gasoliue service station. This 
order was annulled by the appellate division, and the 
court of appeals affirmed. 
The court said, citing Dowsey vs. Keusington (N. Y. 
177 N. E. 427), tlmt the zouiug ordimmce itself might 
be inntlicl in some cases but (like in the case at bar) 
"here, howeYer, the owuer doe:,; uot challenge the va-
lidity of the general restrictions ereated by the zoning 
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ordinance. He asks for dispensation from the letter of 
such restrictions otherwise applicable to his property.'' 
And: 
''The power to grant in a specific case a varia-
tion is subject to express limitations and to 
limitations dearly implicit in the ordinance, no 
power has been (~onferred upon the board of stand-
ards and appeals to review the legislative general 
rules regulating the use of land. It may not 
determine what restrictions should be imposed upon 
property in a particular disti·iet. It may 
not amend such general rules or change the boun-
dary of the districts where they are applicable.'' 
And: 
"It has been entrusted only with power to grant 
a variation in specific cases where strict enforce-
ment of the letter of restriction would cause prac-
tical difficulties or unnecessary hardship, even then 
it may act only where the variation is in harmony 
with the general intent of the zoning restrictions.'' 
''Only ~where the burden of a general restriction 
creates a special hardship upon a particular owner 
can the grant of a special privilege to him in truth 
promote equal justice, that is not shown here. The 
board of standards and appeals has granted a vari-
ation upon proof and finding of hardship due to 
general conditions existing in the neighborhood 
which may call for the exercise of legislative action 
in amending the rule but from which exemption 
cannot be granted by an administrative board. Its 
power is eonfined to relief in proper case from 
hardship unnecessarily caused by application of a 
general restriction to a particular piece of land. 
It may not destroy the general restriction by piece-
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meal exemption of pieces of land equally subject to 
the hardship created in the restriction, nor arbi-
trarily grant to an individual a special privilege de-
nied to others.'' 
People vs. Novick Co., 283 N. Y. S. 762, is not help-
ful because facts do not appear, and only a memorandum 
opinion filed. 
Bradley vs. Zoning Board of Adjustment (Mass.), 
130 N. E. 8!)2, is exceq)ted from alHl, strangely enough 
re:,.;pondents italieise the very proposition that is again:,.;t 
them. True enough the court does hold that the legisla-
ture of a State may delegate to a municipal body or board 
the power to zone. This is generally held to be the law 
and is uot questioned here by any party. Here, however, 
the statutes disclose that such delegated power to make 
zoning re:,.;tridious is in the city commission. 
In the Bradley case such power was expressly dele-
gated by the legislature to the board of zoning adjust-
ment. 
Chapter 488, Statutes of Massachusetts, 1924, ex-
pressly provided that the board of zoning adjustment 
"may, subject to the following conditions, change the 
boundaries of the districts by changing the zoning map, 
etc.'' 
Why such case is cited by respondents in this case is 
beyond our powers of imagination, unless it be that such 
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case seems to have successfully fooled the Montana court 
in the Freeman case. 
St. Basil's Church vs. Kerner, 211 N. Y. S. 470, is 
likewise distinguishable from the case at bar because 
of the express power given to the board of appeals to 
permit a variation as to "use." This point was noticed 
by the court in that case. 
In Dowsey vs. Kingston (N. Y.), 177 N. E. 427, the 
land owner did not apply to the board of appeals but 
brought a suit in equity to have the zoning ordinance 
declared invalid as to him. He prevailed upon that con-
tention. In that case the defendant urged that the plain-
tiff should have sought relief before the board of ap-
peals but the court of appeals of New York held that such 
matter was not for the board of appeals. That its pow-
ers were altogether too limited to take care of the sit-
uation. 
In the case of Spencer-Sturla Co. vs. Memphis 
(Tenn.) 290 S. W. 614, the plaintiff in error had been 
prosecuted by the city of Memphis for maintaining an 
undertaking establishment contrary to the ordinance in 
a restricted district. The conviction was affirmed on 
the ground that the zoning ordinance was within the 
power of the city. 
It was claimed that the ordinance was invalid because 
of the creation of a zoning board of appeals with power 
similar to the board of adjustment here on the theory 
that there was unwarranted delegation of power to such 
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board of appeals, the court however answered this ob-
jection by saying, that the powers of the board were so 
limiteu (as we contenu here) that there was no dele-
gation of the fundamental power of the city with respect 
to zoning, and that the board was not ''a law unto it-
self.'' 
McCord vs. Ed Bond and Condon Co. (Ga.), 165 S. E. 
590, does not aid respondents. There the board of zon-
ing appeals had granted the defendants a permit to main-
tain an undertaking establishment. Such permit was not 
granted under any general power to vary from the strict 
letter in case of hardship, etc. On the contrary, the 
board of zoning appeals under the ordinance was given 
the express power to permit such particular use. That 
portion of the oruinance is quoted in the opinion and it 
was becam;e of this express power that the action of the 
board was sustained. 
In Construction Co. vs. Jackson ( l\id.), 137 At., 278, 
the plaintiff sought manuamus to compel the issuance of 
a permit for certain builuing construction, contrary to 
the restrictions of the zoning ordinance, plaintiff failed 
because of a holding that the ordinance was valid. The 
plaintiff there contended that tlw ordinance ~was invalid 
by reason of the authority therein giveu to the board of 
zoning appeals, to permit certain variances. rrlw plain-
tiff contendeu this "to he au uucoustitutional delega-
tion of unlimited discretion." 
The court held the objection uutenahle because of the 
very limiteu power of the hoanl of zoniug appeals. 
13 
Facey vs. Leo (N.Y.), 130 N. E., 910, is not helpful, 
as there is no opinion in either court. 
Weaver vs. Bishop (Okla.), G2 P. 2, 83:3, dom.; not 
involve the power of the board of appeals. In that case 
defendants were held entitled to maintain a gas station 
for the reason that there was no rcstrict,ion against such 
use in the zoning ordinance. 
In Tau Alpha Holding Corporation vs. Board of Ad-
justment (Fla.), 171 So., 819, the board of adjustment had 
granted a restaurant owner a temporary permit to re-
place a frame building with a brick building in a resi-
dence district. It appeared that the property was in a 
business district when the zoning ordinance was adopted. 
The property was in fact in a business district, and dur-
ing the litigation the city rezoned the territory, and zoned 
it as a business district. The case of course became moot. 
Nevertheless, the court apparently decided that the 
board of adjustment was right but it said that the ordi-
nance under review ''does not give the board of adjust-
ment power to change zoning lines or make other ma-
terial or permanent changes in the ordinance as enacte(l 
by the city." 
There is no business structure within nine-tenths of 
a block in any direction from the Tracy property. The 
zoning restriction applies to all of such property. It 
is a general condition, a general restriction. 
Counsel say that the spirit of the ordinance was ob-
served. This is contrary to the law and the physical 
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facts. The spirit of the ordinance is that gasoline sta-
tions are excluded from this area. The spirit of the or-
dinance, of course, has relation to the uses to which 
property may be put. 
Again it is respectfully submitted that the judgment 
and decree should be reversed. 
E. A. WALTON, 
Pro Se and Attorney for other Appellants. 
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